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1.0 Notification and Authorization  
On March 11, 2010, the Constellation Program (CxP) Manager, Mr. Jeff Hanley, requested the 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to “develop a framework for evaluating whether a 
program has sufficiently complete and balanced plans in place to allow crewmembers to fly 
safely on newly developed human spaceflight systems for the first time: including technical, risk, 
and programmatic considerations.”  The CxP Manager then asked that the framework be applied 
to current CxP plans.  In addition, the NASA Chief Engineer and Chief Safety and Mission 
Assurance (S&MA) Officer requested the framework also encompass future human spaceflight 
systems that may be developed by government and/or commercial providers.   
An NESC out-of-board (OOB) activity was approved on March 11, 2010.  An OOB summary 
was presented at the NESC Review Board (NRB) on March 30, 2010.  The assessment plan was 
approved by the NRB on April 29, 2010.  A status briefing was presented to the NRB on
July 16, 2010.
The key stakeholders for this assessment are CxP, Office of Chief Engineer, Office of S&MA, 
and Commercial Crew Transportation Planning Office. 
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4.0 Evaluation of Readiness for First Crewed Flight 
4.1 Preface
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was requested to develop a generic 
framework for evaluating whether any given program has sufficiently complete and balanced 
plans in place to allow crewmembers to fly safely on a human spaceflight system for the first 
time (i.e., first crewed flight).  The NESC assembled a small team which included experts with 
experience developing robotic and human spaceflight and aviation systems through first crewed 
test flight and into operational capability.  The NESC team conducted a historical review of the 
steps leading up to the first crewed flights of Mercury through the Space Shuttle.  Benchmarking 
was also conducted with the United States (U.S.) Air Force and U.S. Navy.
Historical data shows that there are multiple approaches which have been successful for 
determining readiness for the first crewed flight.  Every approach has to be tailored to the 
specific system design and situation of that particular system and mission objectives.  Because 
specific approaches may vary significantly between different system designs, the NESC team 
determined prescriptive instructions or thorough checklists could not be developed to apply to all 
possible human spacecraft systems.  In the course of the team’s deliberations, however, it 
became evident that there are certain guiding principles that should be applied when developing 
the first crewed flight decision.  A general framework for evaluating whether a program has 
sufficiently complete and balanced plans for the first crewed flight is documented in the narrative 
that follows.  In the appendices that follow, a more in-depth discussion of testing, risk 
identification, risk contributors, risk analysis tools, and a historical perspective are covered.  
The NESC framework presented here includes important factors to consider when developing a 
new system or evaluating an existing system for the first crewed flight.  The NESC team believes 
that documenting these concepts in one place will help to focus on the critical areas for 
consideration and additional scrutiny.  By applying the following framework to a specific design, 
test program, and intended mission objectives, decision makers will have better information with 
which to make the decision for first crewed flight.  To focus the NESC team’s discussion, only 
space transportation to and from low Earth orbit was considered, because these stages represent 
the most relevant and significant risks to a first crewed flight.  For considerations beyond low 
Earth orbit, the framework described in this report can be extended to encompass all mission 
risks. 
The question of when to fly crew for the first time is evaluated at many stages through the 
development of the human spaceflight system—first during the planning stages and then 
throughout development and testing and at major milestones.  While the NESC team was 
requested to look at the planning decision, the concepts described in this report are applicable 
throughout the lifecycle of the program.  Determining readiness for a first crewed flight is 
dependent on the specific system and its mission.  In general terms, the system is ready to fly 
when residual risk has been mitigated to the point where it is outweighed by the need to fly the 
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first crew.  This decision is ultimately the judgment of the program and Agency management in 
conjunction with the design and operations team. 
4.2 Introduction
Determining readiness for a human spaceflight system’s first crewed flight, especially when the 
test flight is part of the overall system certification process, has been a challenge for program 
decision makers.  In addition, this question is not limited to human space flight; it is also 
common in aeronautic and naval applications.  Most aircraft and terrestrial systems, however, are 
designed to have relatively large performance envelopes that allow incremental and reversible 
envelope expansion techniques during development and testing.  In a human spaceflight system, 
once a ground test program is complete, an incremental test approach is difficult.  Many space 
systems events, especially launch vehicle liftoff, de-orbit, and re-entry, are irreversible events 
that require using essentially the entire performance envelope to achieve a safe outcome—
making this decision process even more difficult.   
The decision on first flight is ultimately the judgment of the program and Agency management 
in conjunction with the design and operations team.  There is, however, some general guidance 
that can be used in making these judgments.  Close involvement of the technical and 
management teams throughout the design and development process is essential.  Verification and 
validation (V&V) of safety-critical systems and survival functions are required.  Based on 
previous experience, historical perspectives, and best practices, this report will illustrate a top-
level thought process for making a first flight decision and will help focus the debate and 
discussion on critical areas for consideration and additional scrutiny. 
In the simplest terms, it is time to fly a crew for the first time when it is safe to do so and the 
benefit of flying a crew is greater than the residual risk (see Section 4.3).  This is rarely a 
straight-forward, clear-cut trade off so experience, sound judgment, and established (and clearly 
documented) decision-making processes are essential (see Section 4.4).  In addition, the 
underlying level of confidence the manager has in making the decision must be considered (see 
Section 4.5).  The remainder of this report will describe this concept in greater detail.  
This report focuses on ways to understand the residual risk1 and gain confidence in the decision-
making processes.  Based on the NESC team’s deliberations and collective experiences, 
challenges were identified that are likely to be encountered and examples provided of techniques 
that have been proven (or may now be available) to manage risk to acceptable levels, as thought 
provokers (see Appendices). 
1 In this report, residual risk is defined as the risk remaining after other known risks have been eliminated, managed, 
mitigated, or accepted 
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4.3 Need for First Crewed Flight
Given that the human spaceflight system is designed for human spaceflight, it is accepted that the 
objective is to fly humans when risks to crew safety have been mitigated to the point where the 
need or benefit is worth the residual risks.  The effort then shifts to deciding WHEN it is safe to 
fly crew, not IF a crew should fly.
Senior leaders and decision makers must evaluate the specific test objectives for the mission to 
determine the need for a crew.  Once this need has been established, the focus then shifts to 
ensuring that the necessary safety-related crew interface, safety, and survivability requirements 
are met.  A prerequisite for a first crewed flight is confidence gained through understanding of 
the system design, development, analysis, and testing. 
It should be noted that the decision that crew is needed for a particular test or mission is 
primarily a programmatic decision (program and Agency management).  For the technical team, 
the focus must be on ensuring a safe and technically sound system.   
4.4 Understanding and Mitigating Residual Risk 
4.4.1 Focus on Crew Safety 
The process of designing, developing, and testing a new launch system is very complex and 
involves the spacecraft, launch vehicle, ground systems, mission systems, recovery systems, 
ground crews, and flight test crews.  The program teams have a wide-ranging responsibility to 
ensure the system is adequately assessed, tested, and deemed safe for human flight.  It is 
recognized that, despite the best efforts of the vehicle team, early flights of new systems will 
entail some degree of residual risk.  Therefore, the focus should be on reducing and managing 
safety-related risk to the greatest extent practical.  Initial crewed missions must be conducted 
with a minimum of onboard personnel (either active or passive participants).  Such flights may 
warrant unique contingency procedures/capabilities that will preserve a safe return capability 
(i.e., above and beyond that required for the nominal design mission) utilizing specially trained 
crews.   
In order to focus to those items that are unique to the initial crew participation, it is assumed the 
system/operations design must preserve a safe return to Earth capability in the presence of any 
single failure in any critical functional capability to the maximum extent practical.  Safety issues, 
including providing for a safe crew return, should be separated from those needed only to 
enhance the mission.  Mission enhancement functions of the crew are only considered to the 
extent that they affect safety.  Figure 4.4-1 illustrates this concept.  Safety and crew survival 
(such as abort capability) functions are non-negotiable and must be fully tested, verified, and 
validated prior to the first crewed flight.  For each specific test or mission, additional functions 
will be required to meet objectives that have been defined.  Each subsequent test and mission 
may require additional capabilities.   
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Figure 4.4-1. Focus on Safety-related Items and Risks 
Functions that are critical for crew safety and survival must be established early in the design and 
development process.  These crew safety and survival functions should be formed into a set of 
non-negotiable, first crewed flight requirements that form the basis for required design, 
development, testing, and V&V.  The following criterion is assumed as the basis for determining 
the minimum requirements that must be satisfied in allowing crew participation: 
System/operations design must preserve a safe return to Earth capability in the 
presence of any single credible failure in any critical functional path for the 
intended mission.
The focus then shifts to determining what these safety-critical functions are and the degree to 
which they can be validated2.
2 Verification of a product shows proof of compliance with requirements. Validation of a product shows that the 
product accomplishes the intended purpose—and in the case of models/analysis, that models adequately predict the 
environment and match actual vehicle performance. 
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4.4.2 System Knowledge and Uncertainty Reduction 
Safety must be an inherent part of the design.  Programs must establish requirements for each 
system’s specific design that will address safety-related items (e.g., failure tolerance, risk of loss 
of crew and mission, overall system reliability).  A system-level focus on selection of simple and 
safe solutions to meet critical functions necessary to 
accomplish the mission is required.  These safety-
critical design requirements must be addressed prior 
to the first crewed flight.  Sound aerospace-
engineering practices for design, testing, and 
analysis must include all disciplines that affect any 
aspect of a safe design.  Examples include: 
propulsion; environmental control and life support; 
structures; mechanisms; materials; active/passive 
thermal; pyrotechnics; aerodynamics; flight 
mechanics; loads and dynamics; guidance, 
navigation, and control; electrical systems; avionics; 
software; thermal protection; crew systems; human 
factors; communication; space environments; 
ground operations; and flight operations.  In 
addition, design guidelines and standards associated 
with each technical and operational discipline must 
be considered relative to their effect on crew safety 
(e.g., margins, structural strength, and factors of 
safety).  Including representation from those 
organizations that will operate the system (in flight and on the ground) is also important in the 
design of active systems and user interfaces, as well as during system-level testing. 
Gaining understanding of system design, operation, and performance (hence reducing risk) is 
traditionally accomplished through many factors that have been established as part of sound 
engineering practices.  Figure 4.4-2 highlights areas that warrant particular attention when 
determining first crewed flight readiness.  Specific details and examples are described in 
Appendices A–D. 
Key elements of common aerospace design 
practices instrumental in the path to first flight 
include:
 Implementation of applicable technical 
requirements 
 Utilization of safety analyses in system 
development
 Verification, validation, and testing of 
critical system performance 
 Technical authority involvement 
 Hazard identification and control 
 Integration of human-in-the-system and 
human-error management (both ground 
and flight test crews) 
 Analyses, tests, demonstrations, and  
inspections in ground tests and previous 
flight tests 
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Figure 4.4-2. Major Contributors to Understanding Residual Risk for First Crewed Flight  
Given that the first crewed flight is likely to occur as part of the development process, extra 
consideration for crew safety must be given to the specific mission plan and vehicle 
configuration.  The flight test environment must be compared to previous test 
conditions/parameters and analysis assumptions.  Understanding the environment in which the 
system will operate and how it will vary for different phases of the mission allows the system to 
be tested in relevant conditions and thus reduces uncertainty.  Design and analysis should 
address full flight envelope operation of the spaceflight system’s design capability (including 
induced and natural environments) and failure/abort conditions.  Examples: loads analyses for 
launch, ascent, orbit, entry, and landing (coupled loads analyses); strength/stress/margin 
assessments for critical load conditions; entry heating and thermal protection system 
performance; crew life support; propulsion systems; and trajectories. 
The flight hardware/software for test flights may, however, be in a different configuration than 
for operational flights, or may not be fully qualified.  It is imperative that these differences be 
identified and thoroughly evaluated to fully understand the residual risk.  The key areas that 
require specific attention and scrutiny include: 
 Configuration of the vehicle for flight test versus previous tests
 Fidelity, assumptions, and validation of models versus flight configuration 
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 Analyzed configuration versus flight configuration 
 Certification level and fidelity of hardware/software installed for flight test 
A review of the specific flight configuration should be conducted, along with the implications of 
test results and anomaly resolutions from previous testing and analyses.  Specific analyses may 
be performed for the mission, to include any potential 
contingencies.  It is critical, however, to understand the 
assumptions and fidelity of the models being used, and 
where the results are valid for that particular flight 
configuration.  Accepting data from models that are not 
validated within the range of operation can be 
problematic.   
Another area that poses a potential problem for a first 
crewed flight is the certification level or fidelity of 
hardware/software installed on the vehicle for that flight 
(and of the ground systems used to support and operate the 
vehicle/mission).  Due to timing and the requirements for 
the specific mission, engineering and/or prototype 
equipment may be used.  Additional test instrumentation 
may also be part of the mission configuration.  A decision 
to use an uncertified or off-nominal configuration requires 
a thorough review, including an assessment of any 
possible unintended interactions.
Managing margins is critical to the vehicle design and 
development.  In this case, a margin is the difference 
between the design requirements (including factors of 
safety) and the system’s actual performance capability in 
the worst-case environment and operating states.  
Examples of areas where margins are important include 
power, mass, delta-velocity, structure, and many others.  
Decision makers must understand the margins of each 
system before making a first flight decision.  Planned 
operations are often placarded to stay within system 
capabilities, especially in the early development flights (in 
some cases, such as launch, it is difficult to gain margin 
via placards; propulsion systems may operate near 
maximum levels on every mission).  Through effective 
testing and proper processing, the actual system capability 
can be determined.  Each development flight test provides 
increased knowledge and reduces uncertainty within the 
cleared envelope of operation—allowing for incremental 
“During the second Gemini Launch 
Vehicle Test (GT-2), the launch 
vehicle lost hydraulic pressure in its 
primary control system and had 
switched over from primary to 
secondary guidance and control.  The 
system had detected its own hydraulic 
failure, responded by switching over 
to its secondary system, and then, 
because it was still on the ground, 
commanded its engine to shut off. 
Subsequent investigation revealed that 
unexpectedly high pressure in one of 
the hydraulic lines had burst the 
aluminum housing of a servovalve. 
During development, someone had 
decided that the walls of the housing 
were twice as thick as they needed to 
be; a third of a centimeter of 
aluminum was ample to meet design 
pressures. No one, however, thought 
to test the actual pressure the housing 
would have to withstand, nor was any 
impulse test, as such, included in 
system qualification. More likely than 
not, one or another Titan II had 
suffered the same sort of hard start, 
but the stouter housings that remained 
standard in the missile could survive 
such a pulse while the lighter 
structural shell in the Gemini booster 
could not.” 
From On the Shoulders of Titans: A 
History of Project Gemini by Barton C. 
Hacker and James M. Grimwood, NASA 
Special Publication-4203 in the NASA 
History Series, 1977. 
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envelope expansion as more measurements are obtained and analytical tools are validated.
Figure 4.4-3 illustrates this concept.  The outer oval represents the operational system capability 
or “designed to” envelope, as built up/validated over the course of the test program.  A robust, 
reliable, and safe design incorporates the ability to test specific points of the design where lower 
margins, high risk, etc., occur due to new technology, use of previous technology in an untested 
environment, or other factors.  As in most systems, the amount of margin varies.  In some cases 
the system is quite robust (i.e., large positive margin), in other areas there is little margin (see 
Figure 4.4-3).  Greater margins are required where there is large uncertainty in the design and 
environments.  Understanding the margins, to the maximum extent practical, is vital in 
determining the safety of first crewed flight. 
Figure 4.4-3. Understanding Margins and Incremental System Capability Validation 
Minimizing risk goes beyond meeting requirements and adhering to established standards.  It 
requires exploring what can go wrong and developing mitigations that either eliminate or reduce 
the ensuing residual risk to acceptable levels in the as-built system, including where uncertainties 
might reduce margins to unsafe levels along the flight envelope.  Providing sufficient margin is 
an essential part of mitigating uncertainty and performing a safe mission.  
Prior to crewed flight, the system’s performance and operating margin relative to the natural and 
induced environments must be anchored by validated analysis/modeling and/or testing.
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Knowledge of the design process improves understanding of the limitations of analysis 
techniques—as it is these limitations that are critical to understanding the risk and ultimately the 
safety of the system.  The results from analytical tools are dependent on the accuracy of the 
models and the methods of calculation.  While most results can be calculated to multiple 
significant figures, most models do not have that level of accuracy of the actual 
system/hardware.  Many of the models may be approximations due to limited knowledge of the 
physics, external environment, systems, or limited resources.  These tools have enormous 
potential for improving the development process once their results are validated by 
experimentation in each specific application.  Furthermore, since these model formulations can 
be manipulated to match experimental data at a given condition, they cannot be considered 
accurate until the same formulation is used under multiple plausible conditions.  Such validation 
can, to a large degree, be accomplished through ground testing, but there are several classes of 
measurements that can only be obtained with accuracy in flight (acoustics, aero-thermal, induced 
environments, etc.).   
A critical test list is a key tool for determining when a vehicle is ready for flight.  This list 
contains the tests, along with success criteria, that must be completed to reduce the system risk to 
an acceptable level and would cover the non-negotiable items, as discussed in Section 4.4.1.  
This list should be created early in the development process.  While the overall test requirements 
will be fluid over the course of the program, changes to this critical test list should be rare and 
only done after much debate and agreement among the team.  Adhering to the list will help guard 
against the pressures of limited resources (time and budget) that programs often face during 
development.   
The progression from analysis to ground test and then to flight test (uncrewed and then crewed) 
is also the progression of the fidelity of data that can be generated.  Ideally, safety-critical and 
survival functions would be tested and verified through ground tests.  This is not always 
possible, as flight environments and potential interactions cannot always be anticipated and 
replicated on the ground.  Any safety-critical function that must operate (or must not operate) 
during a crewed mission must be verified and validated to an accepted confidence level prior to 
the first crewed flight.  Flight and ground tests must have similar instrumentation and be in the 
same locations, as much as is practical, to compare data and allow the flight test to validate the 
ground test and the analysis.  A single measurement in any of the testing may not be sufficient to 
validate the system or model.  (See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of testing.)
To understand the uncertainty, and for the flight risk to be accepted, sufficient test measurements 
are needed to verify the environment, confirm the analysis, and confirm location of flight 
measurements.  Flight tests should include: definition of flight test reference missions, 
objectives, flight-specific functions, performance, and verification requirements; and assessment 
of all waivers, deviations, and exceptions.  Finally, the program should ensure the resolution of 
anomalies from previous ground and flight tests and identify deviations from previous tests and 
baseline design. 
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4.4.3 Proven Means of Return to Earth 
A safe return to Earth from any stage of a mission, including launch, must be ensured through 
contingency capabilities and procedures to the maximum practical extent.  Careful thought must 
be given to the entire mission with the goal of always being able to return the crew safely to 
Earth.  In addition, it must be verified that the intended mission can be controlled, with 
uncertainties, to remain within the flight envelope validated for that mission. 
Launch through the atmosphere inherently poses a tightly constrained flight envelope due to the 
rapid release of large amounts of energy by the propulsion system, significant aerodynamic 
loading, and the fact that structural loads may be at their maximum for the launch vehicle and 
some spacecraft components.  Therefore, early human spaceflight designs provided some form of 
“last resort” escape from the launch vehicle during the period from liftoff through maximum 
dynamic pressure (max q-bar), transonic transition, stage separation, and the establishment of a 
functioning upper stage.  Because the range of unacceptable conditions is impossible to define 
with complete confidence, emergency system designs cannot ensure success in every 
conceivable case, but portions of the envelope can and must be verified and validated to be safe 
for supporting human flight.  If a launch escape capability is available, it should not be factored 
into reliability considerations but serve as a last resort to preserve the life of the crew.   
The Space Shuttle configuration, unlike the small crew capsules used in the early programs, 
precluded reliance on escape systems while its solid rocket boosters (SRBs) were burning.
Because SRB thrust termination designs introduced additional safety risks, the design team 
elected to invest the resources necessary to provide assurance that the entire launch system could 
be treated, like primary structure, as having a reliability of 1.0 from ignition through SRB 
separation.  The fact that an unrecognized combination of environments subsequently resulted in 
a catastrophe does not, by itself, invalidate the selected design approach.  Rather, this tragic 
event reinforced the importance of meticulously monitoring flight and test data relentlessly 
pursuing, understanding, and resolving every out-of-family (not just out-of-specification) 
measurement.   
Knowledge of the system and understanding of the residual risks are gained as a system evolves.
Each step of the design, development, assembly, integration, and test process builds the body of 
evidence the decision makers can use to determine the acceptability of the residual risks.
Therefore, the decision of first flight must be considered, planned, and assessed at each step of 
the process.  An important part of this overall process is maintaining and encouraging the open 
discussions and debates within the entire program team—and maintaining a healthy tension 
between the program and technical authorities, operations and design, systems and disciplines, 
etc.
4.5 Confidence
An important consideration in determining when it is safe to put crews in a human spaceflight 
system is the overall level of confidence that the decision makers have in the system.  For this 
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report, the NESC team is referring to subjective confidence based on engineering judgment, not 
statistical projections.  Decision makers gain confidence through a combination of several 
tangible and intangible means.  Some examples and descriptions of contributing factors are 
provided in the following sections.
4.5.1 Design Maturity and Simplicity 
The use of ‘proven’ hardware/software and designs can provide increased confidence, assuming 
similar environments, conditions, applications, etc.  However, the design team should be 
cautious in using ‘heritage’ and ‘off the shelf’ hardware and software.  The use of these proven 
systems must be analyzed and verified for use in new environments and applications.  Designs 
that have additional safety margins at the component, system, or operations levels (as discussed 
in Section 4.4.2) may also merit increased confidence. 
Systems that employ inherently simpler designs, fewer interfaces, and large margins to meet 
their needs will likely increase confidence in their ability to perform safely and reliably.  For 
example, the Space Shuttle drops its landing gear by releasing retention hooks and allowing 
gravity and air loads to deploy the landing gear, avoiding hydraulic or other actuating power 
devices.  Complexity should only be added when there is benefit such as in weight, volume, 
performance, or operations. 
4.5.2  Verification and Validation 
V&V are essential for developing a safe human spaceflight system.  When determining if a 
vehicle is ready for crewed flight, a review of the V&V program should be conducted (as 
discussed in Section 4.4.2 and Appendix A).  A complete and thorough test program will 
increase confidence in mission success.  When a vehicle or system has a significant history of 
testing prior to the current program and the configuration, operational environment, and 
performance parameters are similar enough, the applicable historical test data and analyses may 
be used for verification and can also increase confidence in the system.  Analytical design tools, 
validated with experimental data over a range of conditions, provide the most confidence. 
The test program should always include end-to-end testing and integrate humans, hardware, and 
software to the degree needed to sufficiently understand the dynamics of interaction, control risk, 
and gain confidence in the integrated system.  
4.5.3 Program Team 
The experience and longevity of the program team are significant confidence builders in 
development of a successful human spaceflight system.  
Confidence is enhanced when program management and supporting members of the program 
team (including safety and mission assurance (S&MA) and medical) are responsible for ensuring 
an appropriate emphasis on safety during the design, development, and testing of the launch 
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vehicle, spacecraft, launch-abort system, mission operations, ground operations, manufacturing, 
and other areas.
Teams consisting of members with significant design/development experience in the fields they 
currently support and who have already been through major design, development, and testing 
campaigns provide increased confidence.  A strong systems engineering focus is also important 
in understanding and managing the interfaces and interactions—of both the design and the team. 
Confidence increases when decision makers insist on personal accountability (ownership) for the 
end results; good communication between team members; and operation in an open, positive 
environment.  As stated in Section 4.4.3, maintaining and 
encouraging open discussions and debates within the entire 
team—and maintaining a healthy tension between the program 
and technical authorities, operations and design, systems and 
disciplines, etc., is an important part of developing confidence.
Ideally, the team should be organized so that the decision-making 
authority is delegated to the hardware/system design level, 
thereby allowing timely decisions to be made.  However, final 
accountability remains with the program and Agency managers.  
All decisions must consider safety first and be based on a balance 
of sound technical and programmatic rationale.  It is important to 
note that organizations should have an alternate reporting path or 
governance structure that ensures safety and technical concerns 
are addressed.    
It should be emphasized that hardware/software and system 
contractors are an essential part of the program team.  The contract should allow open 
communication and individual responsibility.  Since most hardware and software elements are 
provided by prime and sub-tier contractors, careful attention must be paid to the applicable 
statements of work, terms, and conditions to make sure that they motivate all parties to ensure 
safety and reliability.  Some contract incentives may drive behavior contrary to what is desired.
A simplified example would be if all award fees are based on simply meeting milestones—
schedule pressure could take precedence over technical matters. 
4.5.4 Program Processes 
For any complex program, established, efficient, effective, and documented processes are 
essential to define how the program functions.  Understanding and ensuring proper program 
processes and outcomes will help determine the level of confidence.   
Examples of processes to be analyzed include technical reporting/authority, technical checks and 
balances, S&MA practices, integration, and documentation.  For instance, decision makers may 
gain confidence when the team has clearly defined and understood roles and responsibilities; a 
strategy for independent reviews and reporting; well-established risk management practices that 
It is important for the entire team to 
remain focused on building up evidence 
to prove that the system is safe for first 
crewed flight. When this focus is lost, the 
team becomes vulnerable to error, 
oversights, and poor judgment. For 
example: 
“The engineers found themselves in the 
unusual position of having to prove that 
the situation was unsafe – a reversal of 
the usual requirement to prove that a 
situation is safe.” Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board Report.
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identify and eliminate, reduce, or mitigate risks; readily available and up-to-date documentation; 
and documented rationale of major decisions. 
4.5.5 Demonstrated Record of Success
Human spaceflight systems typically have well-documented design processes, with thorough 
engineering standards and processes.  Some systems, however, may offer limited access to 
detailed design information.  These systems may have different design and verification 
approaches, as well as differing processes, documentation, or quality-control plans.  From a 
confidence-building standpoint, these kinds of differences and potential shortcomings may well 
be offset, in part, by a demonstrated launch performance record.  This concept may apply to 
complete human spaceflight systems, such as the Russian Soyuz, or components or subsystems, 
such as the RD-180 rocket engine.
An existing system or subsystem may add to the confidence of decision makers if it has 
established a sound flight record in a similar configuration or operation, or if it has undergone 
related systems testing.  Successful components or systems may function or operate within 
specific parameters but if those components or systems are introduced into new parameters, their 
continued success cannot be assumed unless appropriate testing using these new parameters is 
performed.  Decision makers should be cautious if components or systems that were successful 
in previous programs are now used in environments for which they were not designed or tested. 
In addition, understanding of all past anomalies is essential.   
It is important to note that decision makers must remember that past success does not 
automatically translate to future success.  Previous flight history is only one factor in building 
confidence—it is not sufficient by itself to determine readiness for a first crewed flight.  When 
using these previously flown systems or components, it is vital that the technical team has a 
sound basis for confidence in their continued success.  Every system will present its own unique 
set of circumstances that must be thoughtfully considered in a manner consistent with the 
principles described in this report.  In the end, the technical team will be accountable for the final 
results. 
4.5.6 Independent Input and Perspective 
Throughout the process, program and Agency management should seek out and integrate input 
from competent, current, and independent review teams.  It is important that they review the 
program throughout its life cycle and have relevant insight into and knowledge of the design in 
order to make sound observations and recommendations.  However, care should be taken that the 
review team retains their independence and maintains a balance between close participation and 
independence.  In addition, independent technical assessments of new technologies, new 
developments, and expected high-risk areas should be performed throughout the life cycle. 
Confidence is not a number or a data point.  Decision makers must develop confidence to safely 
launch humans by working closely with the entire program team throughout the process of 
designing, building, and testing the vehicle.
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The factors outlined above, along with others, contribute to building confidence in the human 
spaceflight system’s ability to fly a crew safely.  Overall confidence is a combination of many 
considerations and it is important that the contributing factors chosen encompass the entire 
system, including the launch vehicle and ground/mission systems.  Readiness for crewed flight 
operations will always be an integrated judgment call based on the decision makers’ experience, 
knowledge, and level of confidence in the system. 
4.6 Summary
The key points in this report can be viewed as questions that a decision maker may ask 
throughout the process of designing, building, and testing a new crewed vehicle.  These 
questions include (but are not limited to): 
 Are adequate safety features inherent in the design? 
 Does the design preserve a safe return to Earth in the event of a single credible failure? 
 Are the design requirements of the entire system understood and implemented? 
 Does the team thoroughly understand the design and configuration? 
 Has sufficient knowledge been gained through adequate design, analysis, and testing? 
 Have models been thoroughly validated with physical data? 
 Are hazards adequately identified and controlled, including across systems and interfaces, 
to the maximum extent practical? 
 Have the safety-critical and survival functions been identified, verified, and validated 
prior to the first crewed flight (including test flights)?  
 Have the program management and technical teams worked together and has there been 
open communication of issues throughout the lifecycle? 
 Has the first crewed flight decision been considered at each step of the lifecycle? 
 Has confidence been developed throughout the lifecycle and used in making an informed 
judgment? 
 When decisions were made, did the team focus on showing how those decisions affect 
overall safety and risk? 
 Are the program, engineering, S&MA, and operations teams in agreement for system 
readiness of a first crewed flight? 
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The process of determining readiness for a first crewed flight is dependent on the specific system 
and mission.  In general terms, the vehicle is ready to fly when it has been deemed safe and when 
any residual risk has been mitigated to the point that it is outweighed by the need for a crew.  
This decision is ultimately the judgment of the program and Agency management in conjunction 
with the design and operations team.   
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5.0 Acronyms List 
ARC  Ames Research Center 
ATK  Alliant Techsystems, Inc. 
CAD  Computer-Aided Design 
CAM  Computer-Aided Manufacturing 
CxP  Constellation Program 
DFRC  Dryden Flight Research Center 
FEA  Finite Element Analysis 
FMEA  Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FPGA  Field-Programmable Gate Array 
GSFC  Goddard Space Flight Center 
ISS  International Space Station 
JSC  Johnson Space Center 
KSC  Kennedy Space Center 
LaRC  Langley Research Center 
LEO  Low Earth Orbit 
MA  Mercury Atlas 
MC  Monte Carlo 
MCO  Mars Climate Orbiter 
MEIT  Multi-Element Integrated Tests 
MR  Mercury Redstone 
MSFC  Marshall Space Flight Center 
MTSO  Management and Technical Support Office 
NESC  NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NEST  NESC Engineering Statistics Team 
NRB  NESC Review Board 
OOB  Out of Board 
PRA  Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
S&MA Safety and Mission Assurance 
SCA  Shuttle Carrier Aircraft 
SEO  Systems Engineering Office 
SPA  Systems Planning and Analysis 
SRB  Solid Rocket Booster 
SRM  Solid Rocket Motor 
SSME  Space Shuttle Main Engine 
V&V  Verification and Validation 
WIRE  Wide Field Infrared Explorer 
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Appendix A.  The Role of Testing 
Testing is often the most reliable and costly method of V&V.  Unless there is an extensive and 
available body of knowledge about the new vehicle operating in its operational environment, 
testing is often the only way to generate the knowledge needed to buy down risk to an acceptable 
level.  The importance of validating the models and analysis cannot be stressed highly enough.  
A common thread throughout testing and this discussion is the need to validate the models and 
analysis, both those used for design and those used for verification.  In order to understand the 
uncertainty and for the risk to be accepted, sufficient test measurements are needed to verify the 
environment and confirm the analysis.  Models, especially complex models, are often not linear 
and if linear, can include multiple interactions.  Therefore attempting to validate a model 
utilizing a single measurement is not likely to be possible.  The number of measurements will 
depend on the complexity, size of the system envelope, and the model uncertainty. 
Testing demonstrates that the system, hardware, software, and interactions operate safely and as 
expected.  Testing builds on each previous test to generate the body of knowledge necessary to 
determine when it is acceptable to fly a crew for the first time.  Testing progresses from ground 
test to uncrewed flight test and finally to crewed flight tests (see Figure A.1-1).  
Figure A.1-1. Progression of Testing to Build Up Evidence for Safe System Operation 
Determining what tests must be done to ensure that safety-critical items are fully understood is a 
judgment call.  Such a determination is based on model and analysis fidelity and credibility, as 
well as system complexity, technology maturity, heritage systems, design margins, and previous 
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experience.  Important factors to be taken into account when designing a test program include an 
understanding of the test environments and their limitations, what system interfaces and 
interactions are critical to safety, the weak points in the analysis and modeling, and how much 
data are needed to reasonably verify the system.  Repeatability (the ability to demonstrate that 
the vehicle operates the same way more than once) is another important aspect of a test program.  
The severe thrust oscillations (often referred to as pogo) during the Apollo Program illustrate 
how results can be different for the same test.  The first Saturn V launch vehicle carrying the 
uncrewed Apollo 4 spacecraft was thought to have performed nearly flawlessly.  The second 
uncrewed Saturn V unexpectedly experienced pogo greater in amplitude than that tolerated for 
Mercury or allowed for crew exposure during Gemini.    
The definition of the instrumentation and data to be collected from ground and flight testing is 
critical to reducing the uncertainty of the model.  Matching the instrumentation to the models and 
analysis is essential to validate both model and analysis.  While many systems can be mostly 
validated on the ground, few can be fully validated until flight.  Some systems such as 
propulsion, structures, vibration, and acoustics cannot be fully validated by ground tests, so flight 
testing is essential.  Determining what systems can only be validated through flight testing and 
concentrating attention and instrumentation on those elements for the test flights are essential.
Ground Test
Ground testing of hardware/systems is necessary before any flight test.  Ground tests are the 
primary method for ensuring that the models and analyses are valid, and the systems meet the 
requirements and operate safely and as desired.  During the developmental cycle, ground tests 
are necessary to understanding and trading the core technology that will be used in the new 
vehicle.  Typical tests include material properties, avionics architecture, structural strength, 
propulsion systems performance, thermal protection system concepts, aerodynamics, and many 
others.  The next set of needed ground tests are used to verify that the design meets the 
requirements and to validate analysis and models.  The discipline/component ground tests 
demonstrate lower-level requirements and, when combined with integrated tests and the other 
component/discipline tests, help validate the system.  The first time many flight interfaces and 
interactions are demonstrated and verified is in integrated system tests.  Therefore the analysis 
has, at best, limited ability to predict what the interactions will be.  Integrated systems tests start 
at the subsystem level and progress to system-level tests on the vehicle.  The requirements are 
verified and a critical evaluation is made of the subsystem operation.  During the integrated 
testing, it is essential to test at the edges of the performance envelope.  In structures this may 
involve testing at higher load conditions or inducing loads through unexpected paths.  Often a 
full structural test will discover that the load paths are different than expected.  The same is true 
for avionics, propulsion, and other subsystems.     
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The majority of the integrated testing generally requires complex test environments.  
Understanding the differences and capabilities of the test system is important for understanding 
the test results, especially when evaluating whether the system is operating as expected.
Integrated systems testing for many systems (avionics, power, propulsion feed and cooling, 
environmental control and life support, and active/passive thermal control) requires a high-
fidelity simulation to produce realistic data for the systems 
under test.  All items that can be tested on the ground should 
be, including the integration testing of major elements.  The 
behaviors of the integrated major elements are difficult, if 
not impossible to predict and often adversely affect safety.
As with all complex systems, the vehicle’s behavior and 
reactions may change over time based on interactions with 
the environment and between elements—often with 
unintended consequences.  Many of these behaviors will 
require design and/or implementation changes.  As a 
consequence, integrating the essential elements, especially 
those that are related to safety, reduces the uncertainty and 
subsequently the risk.  As a rule, it is difficult if not 
impossible to fully test an integrated system on the full-up 
vehicle.  Therefore, care should be taken to assess the 
impact on safety when integrated element testing is moved 
to the vehicle.  It is critical to ensure that the fidelity of the 
test set-ups is at the level needed to understand the 
vulnerabilities of the systems.  
Prior to any flight test, a set of integration tests must be 
performed on the vehicle to ensure that the vehicle matches 
the systems tested on the ground and the analysis result.  
These tests encompass ground assets as well as the flight 
vehicle.  Subsets of those tests run on the ground are often 
used, as well as additional tests that can only be performed 
on the vehicle.  Environmental qualification testing, another 
major part of ground testing, takes flight or preflight 
components, sub-systems, and systems and exercises them 
in an environment as similar to the actual flight environment 
as can be created on the ground.  Typically, components are 
qualified separately and, depending on the maturity, validity 
of the analysis, and heritage of the component, the environmental testing will be extended to the 
system.  It is important to understand the differences between the test and the flight 
environments.  The tests should be testing the system at the extremes as well as in the “nominal” 
operating range.  Typically environmental qualification tests include loads, thermal, pressure 
(internal and external), electromagnetic interface/electromagnetic control, vibration, and 
Multi-Element Integrated Tests (MEIT) 
were performed on International Space 
Station (ISS) elements during ground 
processing at Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC).  MEIT was conducted to validate 
the operation of flight elements and 
associated systems in an environment 
that was as flight-like as possible— 
where practical, actual flight 
connections, flight hardware 
components, and flight software were 
used.  If available, actual on-orbit 
operators (astronauts), ground 
controllers, and on-orbit procedures 
were also used.  MEIT found problems 
such as an electrical component under-
voltage condition that would have 
prevented start up of an element; an 
activation sequence that was nearly 
twenty times longer than specified; 
requirements that would have led to 
thermal loading and a loss of an 
element; and swapped video signals that 
would have required an additional 
extravehicular activity (EVA) which 
would have increased risk to the crew.  
MEIT found several significant issues 
that were corrected prior to launch, 
whereas resolution of those problems on 
orbit would have been more difficult or 
impossible to accomplish.   
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acoustics.  Qualification testing and analyses should verify the design for all of the expected 
environments, performances, and life (cycle, shelf, and operating times) of each level of 
hardware (part, component, subsystem, and system).  Acceptance testing should screen for 
workmanship, all testable failure modes, and performances at each level of hardware.  The 
acceptance test should ensure that each following hardware copy was manufactured, processed, 
and assembled as the qualification test hardware.
Uncrewed Flight Test  
While knowledge of the vehicle and its systems is increased through ground testing, it is still 
necessary to further understand the uncertainty for the safety-critical elements.  The main goal of 
most uncrewed flight tests is to verify those elements that can only be verified in the flight 
environment and to validate the full system.  It is not possible for ground tests to fully match the 
flight environment, nor can all the system interactions and interfaces be fully tested on the 
ground.  The induced environments are one set of environments that cannot be matched on the 
ground.  Determining which systems can only be validated through flight tests and concentrating 
attention and instrumentation on those elements for the flight tests is essential.  Capturing 
emergent behavior of the system prior to a crewed flight is another goal of the uncrewed flight 
test.  Defining test conditions and instrumentation to capture the behavior of the system is 
critical. 
Uncrewed flight tests can be conducted during any of the program phases: design and 
development, qualification and acceptance, and integration.  Typically, the uncrewed flight tests 
performed during design and development are technology-
feasibility tests, model, analysis, and process validation, and 
risk-reduction tests.  During the development phase, an 
uncrewed flight test is added to verify and validate changes 
whose risk is considered too high for a crewed flight.
Uncrewed flight tests have unique challenges.  Without 
onboard observers, the only way to gain knowledge of how 
the system operated and identify any stress points is through 
data collected from extensive instrumentation systems.  The 
definition of the instrumentation and data to be collected is 
critical to reducing the uncertainty and must be carefully chosen to ensure that the areas of 
uncertainty and those areas vital to model validation are adequately addressed.  Flight and 
ground tests must have similar instrumentation and in the same locations, as much as reasonable, 
to be able to compare data and enable the flight test to validate the ground test and the analysis.
Having enough instrumentation to define the system performance is a necessary and difficult 
task.  There is always the push for more instrumentation against the limits of mass, time, and 
money.  The impact of the added instrumentation on the test environment must be understood 
(i.e., wiring through insulation is a heat transfer path).  Uncrewed testing covers all portions of 
the system, including the launch vehicle, spacecraft, and ground/mission operations.  Special 
attention to a launch-abort system, when launch is part of the mission, is also essential prior to 
The NASA Launch Services 
Program launches unmanned 
vehicles with high-value, one-of-a-
kind payloads.  Based upon desired 
risk levels and classes of payloads, 
NPD 8610.7D requires a minimum 
number of successful launch 
vehicle flights before a payload can 
be flown.
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the first crewed flight.  Because it is a “last chance” escape, additional ground and uncrewed 
flight testing will be necessary.  Understanding the envelope and capability of the system 
through well-validated models and analysis is essential.  Since a launch-abort system is complex 
and there are many unique interactions and interfaces with the launch system, a substantial 
portion of the validation needs to be done with flight testing. 
Crewed Flight Test 
Validation testing may continue on crewed flights when the benefit of the crewed flight is greater 
than the residual risk.  There will be systems that cannot be fully validated without a crew and 
there may be elements of the testing that can be safely delayed, if necessary.  The introduction of 
a crew adds another set of interfaces and interactions that potentially change the performance of 
the system, often in unexpected ways.  These flights, as with the uncrewed flights, will be used 
to gather important test data to verify and validate the vehicle and its systems.  The test flights 
will also be used to gather data necessary to further validate the analysis and models.  As the 
flight program progresses, the analyses and models will be relied on to plan future flights and 
assist in resolving any anomalies or understanding emergent behavior.  While instrumentation 
may be reduced for crewed flight tests, it cannot be eliminated.  Ensuring that sufficient data is 
gathered to continue validation of the system started during ground testing is essential. 
Prior to a crewed flight, the system must be determined to be at an acceptable risk level.  It is at 
this point that an understanding of the differences in ground and uncrewed flight environments is 
critical.  All items required for safe flight should be tested prior to flight to provide sufficient 
safety margin to allow for unexpected events.  Even those items that are not directly related to 
safety must be evaluated before flight to ensure they do not cause degradation in crew safety.
The mission of the crewed flight test must be clearly defined and well understood to increase 
safety and reduce risk.  Each flight mission should be limited to essentials and, as much as 
practical, incremental missions utilized to clear the vehicle for its full operational mission.  The 
first crewed flight should not try to clear the system as fully operational for all its missions.  At 
the same time, the crew should be focused on only those objectives essential to safely completing 
the mission.
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Appendix B.  Techniques for Risk Identification 
The details of NPR 8705.2 (Human Rating Requirements Document) and other NASA Standards 
such as 8715.3 (Safety and Mission Assurance Plan) and 8000.4 (Risk Management Plan)
provide guidance in risk management.  It is essential to have the proactive mindset needed to 
assess what could go wrong, whether in the design phase (including model development and 
validation), testing phase, or operational phase.  The purpose of the documentation on risk 
management is to be more than just a “checklist” to determine that all risks are eliminated.  
Importantly, the purpose is to help focus that proactive mindset in such a way that things do not 
‘slip through the cracks.’  It is vitally important to maintain a balance between the ‘process’ and 
maintain an awareness of what the process is trying to help the team accomplish, namely, to 
ensure thorough risk identification and preclude either eliminating or reducing attention to items 
that could result in an undesirable outcome.  
Over the years, several techniques for identifying risk have been developed.  Because a single 
strategy that works in every situation has not been identified, multiple paths are pursued in 
parallel in an attempt to maximize the opportunity to identify risks at the earliest time.   
Risk identification (and assessment) can be approached from a number of different perspectives.
For instance, either a bottom-up or top-down perspective could be used.  It is important to choose 
complementary approaches to achieve a more complete understanding of the risks.  Top-down 
and bottom-up approaches each have their advantages and disadvantages.  The biggest 
disadvantage of a top-down perspective is that the person doing the assessment may not have a 
sufficiently detailed knowledge of the systems.  However, the top-down approach allows ‘out of 
the box’ ideas and perspectives that a person submerged in the details of the system may not 
have.  One of the bottom-up approach’s biggest drawbacks is the lack of a wider perspective, 
which can miss critical interactions across subsystems.  The strength of a bottom-up approach is 
that perspective is based on a solid knowledge of the details of the system which may not be 
evident to an outside reviewer.  It is for these reasons that a variety of approaches and 
perspectives should be implemented.    
The following information addresses some of the pros, cons, and comments for some of the more 
popular risk identification techniques. 
Simplify what must be assessed.  There are things that MUST work.  So, what are they and 
what can go wrong?  The objective of this mission is (fill in the blank), and what MUST happen 
to achieve that objective?  Where can these few critical things go wrong and then how can I 
prevent those things from going wrong?  This mindset can also be used to simplify the mission 
objectives and what has to be certified before flying a crew for the first time (see Figure 4.4.1).   
Design reviews.  In addition to a program representative, these reviews should include the 
engineering and S&MA community and representatives of the manufacturing, assembly, test and 
checkout, and operations teams.  Independent reviewers should also be included.  It is imperative 
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that designs be fully integrated across systems and interfaces in order to achieve the desired level 
of confidence in risk identification.
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA).  The FMEA was developed as a methodical way 
to examine each component to determine its failure modes and corresponding signatures and 
implications.  This is a valuable technique but relies on judgment and can be labor intensive.
This is a bottom-up approach. 
Fish bone diagrams.  These have proven to be extremely powerful tools, especially in 
conducting accident investigations.  This technique starts with a symptom (e.g., an engine 
ignition failed).  The analysis works backward to identify every step in the functional sequence 
that might cause such an outcome.  It has helped find relationships that were overlooked during 
the FMEA process, but it can be labor intensive.  An ideal approach would be to perform both 
FMEA and fish bone analyses on critical functional paths.  This is a top-down approach.
Mission simulations.  Simulations have been used for decades to prepare operational teams and 
validate mission rules.  Their effectiveness is contingent on having the simulation supervisors 
aggressively search for unusual combinations of actions and events that would challenge the 
team’s knowledge.  The cost of such high-fidelity simulations has been reduced over time and 
provides a powerful technique for identifying unrecognized interactions. If such capabilities can 
be implemented in the early design stage, such simulations will help identify problems early and 
improve the utility of the operational inputs to the design team.  In general, mission simulations 
are a bottom-up approach implemented by the operations community (fail a subsystem 
component and see how it affects overall operations), but can also be a powerful top-down 
approach to assess system interactions and dependencies (a lack of cooling requires powering 
down, but critical operations require staying powered up). 
Configuration management.  Most human spaceflight programs involve many people and 
organizations dispersed across the country.  This decentralized approach can make the programs 
more vulnerable to miscommunication, oversights, and omissions.  The importance of 
configuration management (control what is supposed to be there), configuration accounting 
(awareness of what IS there), materials and parts traceability, and the ability to ensure everyone 
is using the same data sets cannot be overemphasized as a front line risk reduction activity.  In 
general this is a bottom-up approach. 
Checklists and surveys.  Checklists and surveys are probably the most common form of risk 
identification.  They are used to systematically search and identify as many exposures, perils, 
and hazards as possible.  Many people like them because they are standardized, they can be used 
by non-risk management personnel with minimal training, information can be easily categorized, 
and they can be used to create a history.  On the down side, they cannot cover all areas or 
operations and provide limited, if any, financial impact effect.  They also do not prioritize the 
risk exposures that they identify and may not identify new exposures.  This is usually considered 
to be a top-down approach. 
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Policy and procedure reviews.  These are used to identify how an organization functions.  They 
can be done either internally or externally or both.  While there is an opportunity to identify 
exposures, organizational politics may prevent this from being effective.  This is usually 
considered a top-down approach. 
Contract reviews.  This is a broad category and often there is the misconception that because an 
attorney or contract specialist wrote or blessed it, it is acceptable.  Contract review includes a 
wide variety of material, including but not limited to: leases, hold harmless and indemnification 
agreements, purchase orders and sales contracts, bills of lading, warranties, advertising materials, 
employment contracts, service contracts, and insurance certificates.  If a full contract review has 
not been conducted (regardless of the size of the program), it is safe to say there is unidentified 
(passive) risk in that program.
Experts.  Experts bring additional technical depth, experience, and perspective to the risk 
identification process that may not exist internally.  It may be difficult to find qualified experts in 
some disciplines and they could be expensive. 
Common-risk checking.  In most systems disciplines, lists of known risks unique to that type of 
system are available.  Each risk on the list can be checked for application to a particular 
situation.  Depending on the level of technical detail, this can be either top down or bottom up, 
but since it employs a generic type of approach, it is usually considered a top-down strategy. 
Event-based risk identification.  This refers to events that, when triggered, cause problems.  
Hence, risk identification can also start with the source of problems or with the problem itself.  
The chosen method of identifying risks may depend on culture, industry practice, and 
compliance to requirements.  The identification methods are formed by templates or the 
development of templates for identifying the source, problem, or event.  Three common 
perspectives of event-based risk identification are: 
Objectives-based risk identification.  Organizations and programs teams have 
objectives.  Any event that may endanger partly or completely achieving an objective is 
identified as a risk.  
Scenario-based risk identification.  In scenario analysis, a functional decomposition is 
performed to identify and list each step required to be performed to achieve an objective 
or perform a task (similar to a fishbone diagram).  However, then different scenarios that 
illustrate potential issues that may arise in performing that step are explicitly listed     
(e.g., a message must be received and acted upon.  Scenarios are that the message was 
garbled, or not received, or not understood, etc.).  The scenarios may be the alternative 
ways to achieve an objective or step, or an analysis of the interaction of systems that 
causes an issue.  Any event or scenario that triggers a subsequent undesired scenario 
alternative is identified as a risk. 
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Taxonomy-based risk identification.  The taxonomy in taxonomy-based risk 
identification is a breakdown of possible risk sources.  Based on the taxonomy and 
knowledge of best practices, a questionnaire is compiled.  The answers to the questions 
reveal risks [CMU/SEI-93-TR-6 Taxonomy-based risk identification in software industry
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/93tr006.cfm]. 
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Appendix C.  Discussion of Risk Contributors 
There are many different sources of technical risk to a system—some are known and understood 
and many are not.  These unknown risks are often referred to as epistemic or systemic 
uncertainties.  Some of the most important sources of uncertainty include: variability in the 
processes (materials, manufacturing, measurements, etc.), complexity of the system, maturity of 
the hardware/software, reuse of hardware/software, and emergent behavior or unintended 
interactions.  These factors are recognized and understood by the decision makers but may not be 
consciously considered during the decision-making process.  In order to achieve the best possible 
results, decision makers should think through each of the sources of uncertainty before making a 
final decision. 
Typically, concerns with variability, complexity, and maturity are addressed upfront in the 
design phase through conservative margins and requirements.  For example, structural engineers 
may apply knock-down factors or electrical engineers will ensure larger power margins.  This 
can accommodate some of the uncertainty.  As development progresses, extensive testing at each 
stage will also help to identify any weaknesses or unexpected interactions.  Testing of systems is 
more than just verifying requirements, it is also essential for understanding the true operation and 
limitations of a system.  This is also addressed in Appendix A. 
Most managers and decision makers recognize that new designs, technology, and interfaces 
create additional uncertainty, while previous testing increases confidence for the program.  
However, reuse of existing components in new applications may increase uncertainty.  Decision 
makers may assume that reuse of a component of hardware or software will reduce the 
uncertainty level of the system.  Unfortunately this is often not the case.  The new application 
and new interfaces may in fact increase the uncertainty, unless enough time and effort are 
invested in a thorough review and analysis of the particular application.  One example of the 
perils of software reuse without a thorough understanding of the implications was experienced 
by NASA’s Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO).  The MCO reused software code originally developed 
for another spacecraft for the thruster trajectory equation.  The conversion code was in British 
units but the specification called for metric.  The code was obscure and the specification was not 
well understood or reviewed with the reuse application.  The subsequent mismatch of units 
resulted in the loss of the MCO.  
An example that specifically relates to heritage hardware in a different application is Landsat 7.
The instrument on Landsat 7 was the Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus, which had many heritage 
components and a few new ones.  One of the heritage components was the main power supply 
box which converted the spacecraft 28-V direct current power into the secondary voltages 
required for the instrument electronics systems.  The power supply had an input filter that had 
fairly large inductors and capacitors and therefore large complex impedance.  This was not an 
issue for previous Landsats that used this power supply design because these spacecraft had 
unregulated 28-V power supply buses.  However, Landsat 7 had a regulated bus and when the 
instrument was powered, the bus would ring due to the large complex impedance at the 
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instrument power supply input.  The least expensive way to fix this problem at that point in the 
program was to develop and integrate a damping circuit in a separate box on the spacecraft. 
These examples demonstrate a possible downside of reuse: decision makers may be lulled into a 
false sense of security due to successes in the past.  Sometimes such reductions may be the 
appropriate action but a thorough review and analysis must take place first.  Appropriate decision 
making must take into account that similar components will not necessarily behave identically. 
The process of identifying emergent properties and unintended operations of human-rated 
spacecraft must begin at an early stage in the development process to ensure that as many issues 
as possible are recognized and addressed.  Analytical methods can be applied to early systems to 
find and correct possible interactions before the design is complete.  Analysis alone will not 
identify all unexpected emergent behaviors; testing is necessary to ensure that those interactions 
that do present themselves will not create an unsafe situation for the spacecraft or crew.   
An example of this kind of unexpected behavior occurred during the Wide-Field Infrared 
Explorer (WIRE) experiment launch in March 1999.  After the launch, a system anomaly 
occurred in which the telescope aperture cover was opened prematurely, resulting in the release 
of the spacecraft’s cryogenic hydrogen.  The subsequent report on the incident traces the 
behavior to a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) that was used in a circuit for which it was 
not well suited.  The mishap investigation determined that a transient signal occurred after start 
up of the FPGA.  The WIRE report indicated that the testing method used for the spacecraft was 
performed at the hardware-box level only, a method that would not have identified the transient.
The report also stressed that the spacecraft should have been tested in its flight configuration to 
identify these types of behaviors. 
Most engineers and managers recognize unexpected emergent behavior as a source of 
uncertainty in the system’s operation yet few are able to describe a standard process for driving 
out such behavior.  Most system and test engineers suggest additional testing in off-nominal and 
maximum-use conditions as a means of discovering unexpected behavior.  Consciously 
addressing any potential unexpected emergent properties is important and the test program 
should be designed to uncover as much of this behavior as possible. 
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Appendix D.  Evaluation of Risk Analysis Tools 
Just as a proactive mindset is important for the risk identification process, so is an awareness of 
analysis tool limitations and personal accountability and responsibility for the outputs of 
‘accepted’ analysis tools.  Any tool will give an incorrect answer if fed incomplete or inaccurate 
inputs, so any tool used must be given input based on real data whenever possible.  Assumptions 
should only be used when clearly understood and accepted rationale exists for using them.  One 
must always apply a common-sense litmus test to any result.  This can be difficult because good 
judgment often comes from experience, but valuable experience often includes remembering the 
results of poor judgment.  In addition, one must always remember that statistical results can be 
manipulated to tell any story, especially if someone is trying to justify an answer.   
The following information addresses a number of different tools that can be powerful aids for 
making informed decisions about risk. 
System Modeling and Analysis.  This includes a broad variety of methods, including: 
 Solid physical and computer-aided design (CAD)-based models of hardware 
 Concept and flow evaluation tools such as network and event sequence diagrams 
 Models describing physical processes such as stress models or flow dynamics 
models
 Probabilistic models that build on many of these tools by quantifying uncertainty 
Techniques of varying effectiveness are available to model at almost any complexity level, from 
stresses on small regions of a single bolt hole through complex environmental effects on highly 
complex structures.  Perhaps the most important strength of system modeling lies in the 
development of the models: the mere effort of putting the model together will reveal risk 
contributors, consequences, and mitigations during early design stages when changes are 
relatively inexpensive.  Problems of modeling often stem from the fact that they are models, not 
the actual physical system or process.  Assumptions, simplifications, design changes, interactions 
with unmodeled factors, and misunderstanding of the system can be significant, unquantified risk 
contributors.
NASA-STD-7009 (Standard for Models and Simulations) is a valuable reference that can help 
analysts design, use, and communicate results from many types of computer-based models.  
While adherence to this standard does not guarantee avoidance of the problems mentioned 
above, it can be effective in addressing problems, especially when used with other risk analysis 
methods.  Other excellent tools can be drawn from other disciplines, such as systems 
engineering, operations research, human factors engineering, reliability, maintainability, and 
quality engineering. 
Two important types of probabilistic modeling tools are Monte Carlo (MC) simulation and 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). 
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Monte Carlo (MC) Simulation.  This technique gains its name from the city famous for its 
games of chance.  Initially, a system model is constructed.  Instead of deterministic inputs 
(simple point estimates, means, medians, allowables, etc.), important variable or uncertain inputs 
are modeled by probability distributions intended to explicitly reflect the variability or 
uncertainty of each of these inputs.  The model is run (exercised) a number of times (trials).  
Each trial uses a different set of input values, chosen randomly from each input’s assigned 
probability distribution.  The output, then, is itself a distribution of values rather than a single 
number.  If the model and inputs sufficiently reflect reality, the distribution from exercising the 
MC model will be the same as one would expect from operating actual hardware.  For example, 
a drive to work might be modeled using an event sequence diagram.  The model can then be 
perturbed by varying the speed of traffic, number of red lights, etc., according to appropriate 
probability distributions.  Running the model a number of times using different traffic speeds 
weighted by how likely they are to occur will give an idea of not only how long it takes to make 
the drive, but also the range of drive times that might be expected. 
Strengths of MC analyses include generally greatly reduced cost over physical testing and 
improved risk quantification due to gaining estimates of not only means, but also variability in 
responses and insight into drivers of variability of output (sensitivity analysis).  Experienced 
practitioners can construct useful models early in the design process, even with extremely limited 
data.  MC models are particularly useful in modeling stochastic processes, when there is a time 
component in the process or variability.  Potential weaknesses need to be recognized and include 
unmodeled contributors to risk, sensitivity to incorrect assumptions and to probability 
distributions used, plus the significant resources and time that can be needed to assemble and 
exercise models of complex structures, physics, and processes. 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA).  A PRA is a structured analysis that presents a set of 
scenarios, frequencies, and associated consequences.  A scenario contains an initiating event and 
one or more pivotal events leading to an end state, generally an undesired consequence such as 
loss of mission or loss of crew.  The initiating event is typically an energetic event, failure, or 
other perturbation that requires response from one or more systems, or operators, (e.g., an 
explosion of a hydrogen tank).  Pivotal events generally include failures of these responses, 
which enable the end state to occur when the initiating event occurs; an example might be the 
puncture of an oxygen tank due to debris from the initiating event at the hydrogen tank.
The logic of possible scenarios leading from the initiating event is shown using event trees or 
fault trees.  Scenarios are classified into end states according to the kind and severity of 
consequences.  Physics-based models are used for phenomena and dynamic events.  The 
probabilities of the initiating event and the pivotal events are estimated—along with their 
uncertainties—to obtain the probability and associated uncertainty for the scenario.  The scenario 
probabilities are then combined to obtain the total probabilities and associated uncertainties for 
the end states.
The technique is generally used for highly complex systems; however, smaller-scale applications 
can be carried out using simpler models.  PRA on a highly complex system can be time- and 
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resource-intensive, thus expensive; however, it can be more efficient than many other methods 
for modeling highly complex systems, particularly early in the design process when uncertainties 
are greater.  The results of the tool will be no better than the accuracy of the input data and 
assumptions.  For systems early in their design phase, extra care must be taken when assessing 
the inputs to the tool for their validity and applicability 
A method known as Bayesian updating is often used in PRA analysis.  This mathematical 
technique is a quantitative formalization of techniques used in engineering judgment.  Bayesian 
updating is used to reconcile conflicts in data sources and explicitly quantify uncertainties related 
to the lack of credibility, strength, and/or similarity of sources in the analysis results. 
The models and inputs can be drawn from many sources, including raw physics, test and 
historical data, experience from similar systems, and/or expert opinion.  For models that reflect 
high complexity there is often a dearth of directly applicable data, low design maturity of the 
modeled system, and uncertainties about physics and other issues.  In those instances, uncertainty 
analysis is an important part of the PRA and a healthy skepticism is needed when assessing the 
validity of the assumptions and data feeding into the model. 
This leads to both its most important strengths and weakness.  A PRA includes significant 
sources of uncertainty stemming from possibly more assumptions than are used in other 
modeling techniques.  Assembling highly complex models using large numbers of assumptions, 
including uncertain inputs and quantification of their ‘goodness,’ is bound to cause disagreement.  
Disagreements between experts on assumptions and inputs can also be significant.  However, 
explicit evaluations of the risk impacts of the uncertainties and disagreements can be made via 
uncertainty and sensitivity analyses.  This is an important feature of a PRA. 
For applications involving complex systems and new design, it is most likely true that PRA 
results do not exactly reflect accurate ‘absolute’ risk values because of the sheer complexity and 
uncertainties.  In addition, the time needed to construct a PRA can mean the analysis lags design, 
so the ‘current’ design’s actual risk status can be different than the tool’s results.  This said, PRA 
can be tremendously useful, especially as a comparative risk assessment tool for these particular 
applications.  A well-constructed PRA can provide key information on: 
 Quantification of uncertainty levels on risk estimates (example: 5th, mean, and      
95th percentile estimates) 
 Quantitative assessment of system risk contributors and measures of risk and 
reliability effects in trades between different system designs 
 Sensitivities to problems, environments, stressors, age, etc. 
 Quantitative importance and rank orders of contributors to risk 
 Identification and relative importance of knowledge gaps for prioritization of test 
and design choices 
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PRAs can also be tremendously useful for organizing thinking and suggesting priorities in the 
case of actual system problems, especially when the system is complex.  A good starting 
resource on PRA containing further references is PRA Procedures Guide for Managers and 
Practitioners, currently in version 1.1 (NASA Office of S&MA, March 2002).
Demonstrated Reliability Estimate and Associated Confidence.  A quick, useful, often 
misused, and frequently misunderstood summary quantitative method is the demonstrated 
reliability estimate.  It would seem to make sense that if there have been 100 flights and no 
failures, then that program must have demonstrated high reliability.  But there are important 
misconceptions in that short statement.  First, a firm definition of ‘high reliability’ must be 
developed from the program’s acceptable risk posture a’ priori.  For this example, suppose an 
acceptable mission failure rate of 1/200 was stated in the program’s risk-planning documents.  
Second, it must be remembered that each mission is a sample from a population of all possible 
missions.  As such, the current collection of 100 missions is a collection of samples that 
estimates the failure rate in the population of all missions.  It is quite possible to achieve
100 missions without a failure given a population failure rate of 1 in 70; in fact, the program 
could expect to get this result about ¼ of the time.  Obviously, optimism regarding proof of 
acceptable risk is unwarranted. 
Because the set of successful flights can only be used to obtain an estimate of the true risk, a 
required confidence level must be decided upon a’ priori and published along with the program’s 
acceptable risk document to bound the limit of acceptable estimation error on the value.  The 
concept of statistical confidence will not be covered here.  As a rule-of-thumb, a value between 
70 and 95 percent confidence is recommended (closer to 95 percent for easy-to-estimate or
high-risk values; the closer to 70 percent, the more derating by use of larger safety factors is 
necessary).  Many specialized statistics software tools are available to calculate demonstrated 
reliability.  An excellent and free tool for calculating not only true demonstrated reliability 
values but also sample sizes required to prove a reliability risk given a desired confidence level is 
Gary Pryor’s Reliability Test Planner3.
3 Available at www.midmozark.com\rtp.html.  A tutorial is available through NASA’s NESC 
Engineering Statistics Team (NEST) by contacting the NESC at www.nesc.nasa.gov.
NASA Engineering and Safety Center
Technical Assessment Report
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
10-00619
Version:
1.0
Title:
Readiness for First Crewed Flight
Page #:
39 of 58 
NESC Request No.: TI-10-00619 
Appendix E.  Historical Perspective on First Crewed Flights 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a general discussion of the steps leading to the first 
human flights of all NASA crewed launch systems from Mercury through the Space Shuttle.  
The material in this appendix was synthesized from a survey of readily available public 
documents (listed in Appendix G) and personal experiences related to: 
 Preparing for the first crewed flights of the Space Shuttle, Apollo spacecraft, and Saturn 
launch vehicles 
 Working with those responsible for developing and flying Mercury and Gemini   
 Developing and committing one-of-a-kind robotic systems to flight 
 Executing experimental and developmental flight tests of aircraft and rockets 
Team members used personal experience along with information published in applicable NASA 
special publications (SP) to infer the basis for management confidence in committing crews to 
flight during the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Space Shuttle Programs.  The material contained 
in this appendix reflects these observations but should not be taken as total evidence of the actual 
thought processes and logic that were used in making these historic decisions.  Nevertheless, the 
team believes that the observations in this appendix are consistent with history and warrant 
consideration in planning for initial crewed missions for future human-rated systems. 
A space launch/transportation system for the purposes of this discussion includes the launch 
vehicle, spacecraft, and components required to return humans safely to Earth from any point in 
a low Earth orbit (LEO) mission.  The scope of this overview is limited to identifying the basis 
for confidence in the ability to execute functions that must be performed in order to send humans 
into space and return them to Earth with reasonable assurance.
Early Human Spaceflight Programs
The three early human spaceflight programs (Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo) are reviewed as a 
single series of missions.  While the mission and vehicle designs for each program were 
different, the management processes and technical approaches were very similar.  This similarity 
likely reflects the fact that the same core government teams that led development of the Mercury 
spacecraft and Redstone launch vehicle also led development of Saturn, Gemini, and Apollo.  In 
addition, following Mercury, each program leveraged the design and data from the previous 
program.  The development and preparation for human flight was guided by experience gained 
along the way.  Ultimately all three programs were focused on the same eventual Apollo goal of 
landing men on the Moon and returning them safely to Earth. 
The “man in space” Program was introduced just 6 days after NASA was formed on          
October 1, 1958.  The Program was renamed Project Mercury on November 26, 1958.  Project 
Mercury involved three distinct systems: the Mercury spacecraft (capsule), the launch vehicles 
(Redstone and Atlas), and the launch escape system.  The Mercury spacecraft (capsule) was a 
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cone-shaped, one-man capsule with a cylinder mounted on top.  It was 2 m (6 ft, 10 in) long and 
1.9 m (6 ft, 2.5 in) in diameter.  A 5.8-m (19-ft, 2-in) escape tower was fastened to the cylinder 
of the capsule.  Project Mercury’s design philosophy was based on practicality and relatively 
simple requirements.  Basic guidelines and criteria were established and observed in the design 
and development of the Mercury spacecraft and further extended to the modification and 
accommodation of the two Mercury launch vehicles, the Redstone and Atlas.  The Mercury 
Redstone (MR) and Mercury Atlas (MA) critical paths for a safe return to Earth are shown in 
Figure E-1.1. 
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Figure E.1-1. Mercury Redstone and Atlas Critical Path for Return to Earth 
With critical functions identified and a development strategy defined, the program prepared a 
flight test sequence that would validate all critical functions required for each manned mission at 
the earliest time.  The first missions collected data needed to complete spacecraft and launch 
escape system (LES) designs.  Boilerplate spacecraft were used to show that each launch vehicle 
was compatible with the spacecraft.  Finally a series of envelope expansion flights was made 
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with “production” spacecraft. A series of 18 uncrewed test flights of the Mercury spacecraft was 
conducted on various launch vehicles (Little Joe, Big Joe, Mercury, Atlas) to check out the 
performance of critical spacecraft systems. A primate named Ham was launched on Mercury 
Redstone 2 (MR-2) on January 31, 1961, prior to flying humans for the first time on                
May 5, 1961.
It should be noted that the Mercury launch vehicle development heavily leveraged previous 
systems and testing by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency.  Mercury used classic flight envelope 
expansion techniques to demonstrate human compatibility with launch and entry environments 
before evaluating human utility in orbit.  The build-up sequence began with qualifying Redstone 
for suborbital flight with the Mercury spacecraft, demonstrated compatibility with a primate, and 
concluded with crewed missions.  The Atlas launch vehicle was qualified for orbital flight in 
parallel with the Redstone missions and then used a primate to validate the life support systems 
and compatibility with increased time in zero gravity.  Human compatibility and utility were 
evaluated by a series of flights with increasing time in zero gravity.  Qualification of the launch 
escape system and procedures for launch, flight operations, and recovery were pre-requisites for 
all human missions.  Satisfactory completion of the flight-test sequence, hardware qualification, 
and validation of critical function fault tolerance was expected to provide sufficient evidence of 
readiness for first crewed flight.
Following the successful test of MR-2, consideration was given to launching a human on a 
suborbital trajectory on the next Mercury-Redstone launch.  Dr. Wernher von Braun met with his 
leadership team at MSFC to develop a recommendation on how to proceed.  The team, with one 
exception, was prepared to fly a human on the next launch.  Typically, Dr. von Braun attempted 
to arrive at team consensus, but frequently decisions were made without unanimous agreement 
among the team members.  The lone dissenter in this meeting believed that it would be wise to 
fly one more test that, if nearly perfect, would provide confidence to man the next flight.
Dr. von Braun decided that the historical nature of launching the first American into space, 
dictated that his team agree unanimously on the recommendation.  As a result, one additional 
flight test (MR-BD) with a boilerplate spacecraft was flown on March 24, 1961.  The flight was 
fully successful.  On May 5, 1961, a Redstone rocket launched astronaut Alan Shepard into space 
in a Mercury spacecraft designated Freedom 7.  Just 15 days later, on May 20, 1961, President 
Kennedy announced the Apollo Program to a joint session of the U.S. Congress. 
Because it was the first U.S. human spaceflight program, the first crewed flight decision for 
Mercury was arguably the most difficult—with the most unknowns.  The man-rating program for 
the Redstone, Atlas, and Titan launch vehicles was characterized as follows:  “The total man-
rating program fell into the general categories of minimum redesign, an extensive quality 
program, the development of an abort sensing and implementation system, and a program 
discipline which insisted through meticulous attention to detail that we not fly when there were 
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any unanswered problems concerning the status of any of the hardware.” 4 Only those changes 
necessary to adapt the vehicle to the requirements of the mission and those necessary for the 
improvement of safety were authorized.   
Gemini was the next human spacecraft after Mercury.  The spacecraft was an enlargement of the 
familiar Mercury capsule—5.8 m (19 ft) long, 3 m (10 ft) in diameter, and weighing about   
3,810 kg (8,400 lb).  Engineering changes simplified maintenance and made it more 
maneuverable for the pilots.  The Titan II rocket, more powerful than the Redstone or Atlas 
rockets, placed the larger spacecraft into orbit.  Sometimes referred to as Gemini-Titan for the 
craft and its launch vehicle, each flight was designated by a Roman numeral.  The Gemini 
spacecraft had approximately 50 percent more volume than the Mercury for twice as many 
crewmembers.  Aircraft-type ejection seats replaced the Mercury Project’s escape rocket.  The 
Gemini spacecraft was designed with essentially the same type of redundancy features that had 
been employed in Mercury.  One significant departure from Mercury was that the Gemini crew 
was given the capability to make the decision to abort based on inputs from selected sensors. 
The launch vehicle for the Gemini missions was the Titan II.  As with the Atlas, an intensive 
investigation of Titan performance and all past failures was undertaken in order to pinpoint the 
vehicle areas that needed to be modified, redesigned, or made redundant.  As a result of these 
studies, it was determined that the flight control, propulsion, electrical systems, and hydraulic 
systems were the areas that needed reliability improvement and possible redundancy.
The first human Gemini launch occurred on March 2, 1965, after two successful test flights of 
Gemini I and Gemini II were conducted and all primary test objects achieved.  The Gemini 
critical path for a safe return to Earth is shown in Figure E.1-2. 
4 Culbertson, “Man-rating the Atlas as a Mercury Booster,” America Institute of Aeronautics, paper No. 65-252, 
WAFLUASD Support for Manned Flight Conference, Dayton, OH, April 21–23, 1965. 
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Figure E.1-2. Gemini Critical Path for Return to Earth 
The 10 crewed Gemini flights demonstrated the capability to subject two men and supporting 
systems for the challenges of longer duration flights as required for the later trips to the Moon; to 
effect the rendezvous and docking with other orbiting vehicles for Apollo; to perfect methods of 
reentry and landing at a pre-selected landing point; and to gain additional information on the 
effects of weightlessness on crew members and to record the physiological reactions of the crew 
during long-duration flights. 
The Apollo Saturn IB was the first launch vehicle developed specifically to carry humans into 
space.  The Redstone, Atlas, and Titan systems all had their origins as ballistic missiles.  In order 
to launch humans, a process called “man-rating” was followed that included various 
modifications which were subsequently validated through a combination of ground and flight 
testing.  Although the Saturn IB would also be used to launch uncrewed payloads, it was 
designed from the outset to be able to safely launch crews into orbit.  The Saturn IB flew four 
uncrewed flight tests, all considered fully successful.  Based on the success of these 5 S-IB test 
flights and the 10 successful flights in the Saturn I test series, the decision was made that the 
Saturn IB was ready for its first crewed orbital flight test in October 1968.  The Apollo critical 
path to a safe return to Earth is shown in Figure E.1-3. 
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Figure E.1-3. Apollo Critical Path for Return to Earth 
In reviewing the previous human spaceflight programs, common traits became evident.  First, 
clear definitions of the end result (objectives), the method by which they were to be achieved 
(guidelines), and development and verification that was required prior to flight (development 
tasks) were established at the outset.  For all the early programs, the decision makers determined 
that the following conditions were met: 
1. The development team was confident that the evidence of task completion was 
compelling. 
2. There were no uncorrected, not understood, or unverified corrections to design-related 
anomalies.  
3. The development team was confident that (a) the mission could be executed as planned 
and (b) no single credible failure could prevent returning the crew safely to Earth (as 
depicted in Figures E.1-1 through E.1-3).
4. Flight and mission systems replicated the certified design configuration and 
specifications. 
The history of the early human spaceflight programs includes numerous developmental tests, 
both ground and flight.  The development process focused on building and ground testing 
systems at the highest level of assembly and flying test articles at the earliest possible time to 
gather data needed for design refinement.  As part of this build, test, and “fix what doesn’t work” 
approach, failure to fully achieve specific test objectives was not a showstopper unless the data 
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were deemed insufficient for design and validation purposes.  Hence, the development process 
included a robust ground test program that emphasized critical functionalities.  A few examples 
include:  
 Structural test article tests to demonstrate full design capabilities with appropriate 
margins  
 Water-landing tests to demonstrate structural integrity and performance in worst-
case scenarios
 Full-scale parachute deployment tests to demonstrate chute operation, strength, and 
the ability to reliably deploy and inflate the drogue and main parachutes 
 Post landing flotation 
 Water-drop tests to demonstrate effectiveness of air bags in reducing crew landing 
loads 
 Crew couch tests to demonstrate non-injurious crew loads 
 Mission simulated timelines with production spacecraft (and crew) in vacuum 
chambers 
 Series of special space mission testing to exercise planned and contingency scenarios 
with all systems running   
 1,730 J-2 engine tests before Apollo 8 
 Ground vibration tests for launch vehicle and spacecraft combinations 
As part of the development cycle, classic flight envelope expansion techniques with prioritized 
building blocks were used to demonstrate human compatibility with launch and entry 
environments before evaluating human utility in orbit.  The first missions collected the data 
needed to complete spacecraft and launch systems design/ratings using boilerplate spacecraft.  
Boilerplate spacecraft were initially used to show that each launch vehicle was compatible with 
the spacecraft.  Finally a series of envelope expansion flights was made with ‘production’ 
spacecraft building up to a primate and then a human flight.  The need to repeat or re-fly a test if 
a targeted test condition or component was modified was based on engineering judgment.
A significant, yet unquantifiable factor that led to the overall success of the early human 
spaceflight programs was the strong, well-established technical and management teams.  
Working together so closely, for so long, and in such a fast-paced, pressure-filled environment 
built strong relationships and understanding.  Each team member was accountable for their own 
system/components and related decisions.  The senior managers were technically proficient and 
remained personally involved from inception through flight, continuously asking “what if” and 
“how do you know” questions.
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The Space Shuttle Program 
The Space Shuttle represented a significantly more complex system than the early human 
spaceflight programs.  George Low, leader of the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office, noted after 
a Moon landing that only 100 wires linked the Saturn rocket to the Apollo spacecraft.  He wrote. 
"The main point is that a single man can fully understand this interface and can cope with all the 
effects of a change on either side of the interface.  If there had been 10 times as many wires, it 
probably would have taken a hundred (or a thousand?) times as many people to handle the 
interface."5  This also meant that, in the preceding programs, contractors and NASA Centers 
could develop hardware in relative isolation from one another, which enabled work on multiple 
parts of the system to progress in parallel.  The Space Shuttle, on the other hand, had to be highly 
integrated because of its requirements for re-usability and the ability to land like an aircraft on 
any 10,000-ft runway, among other reasons.  The tight integration of the Space Shuttle also 
required intensive communication and good working relationships among the different 
organizations involved in its development.  The aerodynamic shapes of the Orbiter and launch 
configurations were much different than the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo spacecraft, which 
meant a significant set of new development challenges for even the experienced workforce 
involved in its design and development.  The Space Shuttle critical path to Earth is shown in 
Figure E.1-4. 
5 SP-287, "What Made Apollo a Success." George M. Low, introduction. Accessed on 10/12/10 at: 
http://klabs.org/history/reports/sp287/ch1.htm;  SP-4219, “The Space Shuttle’s First Flight, STS-1,” Henry C. 
Dethloff;  SP-6104, “A perspective on the Human-Rating Process of U.S. Spacecraft: Both Past and Present,” 
George Zupp, Editor, February 1995. 
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Figure E.1-4. Space Shuttle Critical Path for Return to Earth 
Considerations for crew safety were a tremendous challenge over previous programs due to the 
vehicle’s complex launch and reentry configuration.  One of the most significant challenges was 
how to address the issue of first-stage aborts (while the SRBs were thrusting).  The unique Space 
Shuttle system design took the Program down a different solution path than previous programs.  
Several first-stage abort concepts were considered for the Space Shuttle but each introduced its 
own significant safety risks and complexities.  As a result, the decision was made that these 
additional risks and complexities were of greater concern than the presumed low failure rates of 
the solid motors.   For those areas deemed ‘high risk’ more stringent design requirements were 
derived to build in greater reliability.  For example, simultaneous ignition, simultaneous thrust 
tail off, and similar thrust profiles were absolutely critical and received extraordinary attention 
and ground testing.  Previous human spacecraft included additional safety through escape 
capsules or crew ejection in order to accept the less than desired launch vehicle reliability.  The 
Space Shuttle, alternatively, used an historical solid rocket motor (SRM) performance database 
and extensive testing to minimize risk and deemed the vehicle acceptable for crewed flight 
without first-stage abort capability.6
6 SP-6104, “A perspective on the Human-Rating Process of U.S. Spacecraft: Both Past and Present,” George Zupp, 
Editor, February 1995. 
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The Space Shuttle Program’s significant emphasis on the approach of focusing on reliability 
and/or redundancy of high-risk areas relied on extensive testing and quality control processes 
being successfully implemented as part of the decision considerations to fly a crew on the first 
(or any) launch.  The effective and appropriate use of test articles and test results was vital.  The 
Space Shuttle Enterprise played a large role in supporting this approach. 
The Enterprise was not designed to be capable of spaceflight.  It was designed and built as a test 
bed for conducting the horizontal ground vibration tests (HGVTs) at the manufacturing plant.  
The HGVT activity was designed to test the structural integrity of Space Shuttle Orbiters with 
particular emphasis on launch and landing conditions.
Later, Enterprise was modified to support the approach and landing tests at Edwards Air Force 
Base in California.  Many systems that would be required for an actual flight into space were 
either simpler versions or were not even aboard Enterprise for these tests.  The Enterprise
approach and landing tests included four categories (this is also an example of how to do 
incremental test build ups with aircraft): 
1. Three Taxi Tests, intended to verify the taxi characteristics of the 747 Shuttle Carrier 
Aircraft (SCA) while carrying a Space Shuttle.  These were runway taxi tests only and 
did not involve flight.  No crew flew aboard Enterprise for these tests.  
2. Five Captive-Inactive Flights, intended to verify the performance, stability, and control of 
the SCA while carrying a Space Shuttle in flight.  No crew flew aboard Enterprise for 
these tests.  
3. Three Captive-Active Flights, intended to determine the best separation profile that 
Enterprise could utilize as it separated from the SCA during upcoming Free Flights, 
refine crew procedures, and evaluate Enterprise flight systems.  A two-man crew flew 
aboard Enterprise for these tests.  
4. Five Free Flights, intended to verify the airworthiness, integrated system operations, 
pilot-guided landing systems, and automated landing systems of the Space Shuttle.  A 
two-man crew flew aboard Enterprise for these tests.  The first four glides to the Rogers 
Dry Lake runway provided real envelope expansion.  The first three drops were 
conducted on the lake bed with a drag-reducing tail cone over the boat tail.  Flight 4 
removed the tail cone but used the long lake bed so that there was no pressure to try to 
land on the spot.  Finally, flight 5 was targeted for the concrete runway without a tail 
cone to evaluate the braking and roll out control that would be representative of an 
operational return.
At the conclusion of the Enterprise approach and landing tests, NASA certified the Space Shuttle 
Orbiter as aerodynamically sound for subsonic flight and determined that no additional flight 
tests would be necessary.  Enterprise, as a high-fidelity pathfinder, was then extensively used to 
test Kennedy Space Center (KSC) equipment and procedures that would be necessary to support 
processing operations of a Space Shuttle.  
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The use of the Enterprise in testing is only one example of the extensive hardware, avionics, 
software, and operations development and testing that were done in preparation for getting the 
Space Shuttle ready for its first launch.  The complexity of the Space Shuttle introduced 
numerous additional interactions and dependencies (such as thermal and power management, 
GN&C and mechanical system dependencies, and complex software integration and 
management) and required much more integration and testing to ensure proper coordinated 
functionality.
The baseline plan in 1973 was to fly the first Space Shuttle mission with a crew, yet preserve an 
option to launch without a crew.  However, at the Program Director’s Review in June of that 
year, two key issues were raised:  Should the first flight be baselined with a crew, and if so, 
should ejection seats be used?  The Program wanted to avoid dual mode vehicle design and focus 
the Program along a single path.7
Part of the rationale for deleting the uncrewed flight test options was that the successful return of 
the Orbiter was critical to the continuation of the vertical flight test program (one of a kind 
spacecraft), and the crew would significantly increase the probability of this success.  There was 
a recognized risk to the crew, but the Space Shuttle design effort and test program was geared to 
establish confidence in the system.  It was postulated that maintaining a dual path would detract 
from or compound the development effort of the baseline crewed system, thus reducing its 
reliability and robustness. 
The major points discussed at this key review were the necessity of recovering the Orbiter, past 
experiences of crew members saving a mission from failure, confidence in ground-test programs, 
crew ability to deal with contingencies (i.e., landing at alternate sites), preventing hazards to over 
flight of population, capabilities of abort and ejection systems, and the impact of an uncrewed 
option on crewed design effort (uncrewed capability requires a successful auto land program).  
The decision from that review was to proceed with design, development, and testing of the Space 
Shuttle considering only a crewed first flight and to discontinue development of the uncrewed 
option.  It was also stated that the decision would be reviewed again 18 months before the first 
orbital flight.  The rationale was that as the benefits of crewed flight (greater probability of 
success, less risk to fly over populated areas, lower cost, and better operational system) far 
outweighed the crew and program risks involved. 
In 1977, at the planned review 18 months prior to launch, the conclusion remained that the 
crewed first flight test was superior for reasons of mission success and avoidance of diluted 
program effort, and the crew risk was acceptable.  The reasons supporting the original decision 
were essentially unchanged and the maturing of the Space Shuttle design and the test program 
experience increased the overall confidence.  
7 “Chronology of Decision, Manned versus Unmanned Vertical Flight Test for the Space Shuttle,” compiled by 
Code Q, NASA HQ, August 15, 2002.
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Although program and Agency management decided that the first Space Shuttle flight would 
include crew, they had to ensure a safe and successful first flight.  As a result, the team pushed 
the envelope in design analysis and ground testing.  For example: 
 Many wind tunnel years were devoted to building an aerodynamic database for each 
configuration over the entire range of Mach numbers 
 Thousands of hours of super-computer time evaluating structural models combining 
thermal and dynamic loads 
 Validation of redundant data systems involved years of hardware and software 
compatibility tests in dedicated facilities 
 Development and validation of the stand-alone backup flight computer to protect against 
loss of the tightly synchronized redundant computer set 
 Years of development testing for thermal protection systems 
 Years of system operation simulations to develop and test flight procedures and rules 
 Developed Shuttle training aircraft to support development of approach and landing 
techniques and crew training 
 Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME) had 726 starts and 110,000 seconds of testing 
before STS-1 
 SSME certification tests demonstrated boundary of performance on ground before first 
flight
 External Tank structural test article with over 1,000 strain gauges 
 Mated ground vibration test provided design information for guidance and control 
systems 
 SRM underwent full-scale static tests before first flight that included four development 
motors and three qualification motors 
The first four Space Shuttle missions using Columbia were deemed to be orbital flight test (OFT) 
missions.  The OFT configuration included thousands of pounds of development flight 
instrumentation.  Each of the OFT missions included a minimum crew of two and employed 
ejection seats (which were later removed).  The first crewed Space Shuttle launch occurred on 
April 12, 1981. 
General Observations
On the surface, it may appear that each of the four programs discussed did not follow the same 
approach to determining the first crewed flight, as each occurred at a seemingly different time in 
the test program.  This is due, however, mainly to the differences in system design and mission.  
Though each decision was not reconstructed, it was evident that each program followed similar 
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thought processes outlined in the body of this report.  Each event on the critical path to a safe 
return to Earth was thoroughly tested and the programs were continually questioning the results, 
data, and previous assumptions. The residual risks were discussed at all levels of management 
and open deliberations and communications were evident throughout the program teams. 
While Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo were formally separate programs, in practice they 
functioned as one decade-long program leading up to the accomplishment of the mission set 
forth by President Kennedy in 1961 to send a man to the Moon and return him safely to Earth.  
The knowledge gained in each program informed all of the subsequent programs.  The same held 
true for the workforce, which transferred relatively seamlessly from one program to the other.  In 
one decade, for example, a group of engineers that had never before built a spacecraft went on to 
develop four (Mercury, Gemini, Apollo 
Figure E.1-5).
Lunar Module, and Apollo Command Module) (See 
Figure E.1-5. U.S. Human Spaceflight Development 
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This previous workforce experience carried over beyond Apollo and Skylab to the development 
of the Space Shuttle and was invaluable in that development.  Though the Space Shuttle posed 
altogether different technical challenges than the earlier programs, there was strong continuity of 
engineering design and operations personnel from the early programs to the design and 
development of the Space Shuttle.  Few of these experienced engineers and managers have been 
a part of the development of the newer human spaceflight programs. 
The second-generation workforce, on the other hand, did not have the benefit of developing and 
operating a new human-rated launch system for more than two decades between the first launch 
of the Space Shuttle and the establishment of CxP.  It can be noted that there was some 
continuity in the design of human-rated spacecraft and significant upgrades within the launch 
vehicle.  There were also other programs initiated, but not fully developed, tested, and put into 
operation.  Another change that shaped the second-generation workforce was the growing role 
that information technology played in the work of engineering.  The primary computational tools 
for the first-generation workforce that developed Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo were slide rules, 
pencils, and paper.  NASTRAN, a finite element analysis (FEA) program, was introduced in the 
late 1960s, by which time the design and development of the Apollo Program was complete.  
Some of those tools were later used in an assessment of Apollo performance and flight data.  By 
the mid-1980s, the use of modeling tools such as CAD and computer-aided manufacturing 
(CAM) had become standard practice and these tools grew increasingly sophisticated over the 
next decades.  While modeling tools revolutionized the practice of aerospace engineering, they 
also distanced practitioners from fundamental calculations, making them dependent on the 
assumptions embedded in the software.  The earlier work methods, while arduous, aided in the 
rapid development of engineering judgment by ensuring that practitioners understood the 
numbers that informed their designs.  
While the technical and technological issues faced by previous and future human-rated space 
programs may be different, the same fundamental factors that are essential to mission success 
remain the same: sound engineering judgment, attention to detail, continuous questioning, 
technically competent engineers and managers, and constant vigilance. 
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Appendix F.  Benchmarking with U.S. Navy and Air Force Flight Test Center 
In assessing when to fly a crew on a new vehicle for the first time, the inputs and experiences 
from other organizations with similar crew implementation requirements were sought.  Personnel 
from the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) at Edwards Air Force Base in California and the 
U.S. Navy’s Virginia-class Program Office (for submarines) were consulted on their respective 
processes and practices for putting into service first-in-class crewed vehicles.  Both of these 
organizations have a history of developing and testing high-risk vehicles in severe environments: 
the U.S. Navy’s nuclear submarines and the U.S. Air Force’s advanced aircraft.  Nuclear 
submarines operate in an extreme depth under high water pressure and at the edge of 
performance, and advanced aircraft operate in the extreme conditions of the atmosphere at the 
edge of performance.  Both organizations develop and test new systems on a regular basis; the 
last new submarine class was in 2000 and the latest advanced aircraft is the F-35 (December 
2006).  While the advanced systems are developed primarily by industry, both government 
organizations are involved in the development process and have the final safety review and 
acceptance prior to a first use of the new systems.  Therefore their experience and processes were 
considered relevant to this study. 
Both organizations were asked to address the following questions: 
 How is it determined when in the test program to add the crew for the first time?  Can 
requirements be reduced if the configuration is similar to a previous vehicle?  What 
tradeoffs, if any, are considered? 
 How is it determined that the benefit of having a crew is greater than the risk to the crew? 
 Have the processes been documented (such as standards or policies, etc.) that specifically 
outline what is required before a crew can be put on board to operate the vehicle?  If so, 
what is the documentation and does it change for differing environments? 
Air Force Flight Test Center Experience 
The AFFTC’s mission is to developmental flight test a system to determine if it meets 
specifications, uncover any problem areas, and ultimately recommend whether the system is 
ready to proceed to operational testing.  Their approach is based on the diversity of systems, 
from new state-of-the-art fighter aircraft to a fuselage tank on 50-yr-old aircraft, for which they 
are responsible for establishing flight safety.  This broad spectrum of systems requires processes 
and requirements that can be tailored to meet the needs of each system.  Rarely have there been 
vehicles that are flown first without a crew and then with a crew, therefore the decision process 
for adding a crew is in place for the first flight.  A broad combination of ground analysis and test 
is required before a first crewed flight, with each unique program or system evaluated 
individually.
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The AFFTC utilizes multiple reviews, including those for the developmental flight test, 
operational flight test, and operational use.  There is a distinct difference in what level of risk and 
uncertainty may be acceptable prior to proceeding with a flight test program versus sending the 
system to an operational unit for routine use.  For readiness to proceed to operational testing or 
deployment, the results from the flight test program are added to the results from the ground test 
and analysis to assess an overall risk.  The AFFTC may decide the risk is acceptable to proceed 
with flight testing, but that the risk is not yet sufficiently low to proceed with operational 
deployment, including operational testing.  A risk matrix is utilized, which attempts to identify 
specific risks along with the probability of occurrence and the consequences if they do occur.
Many of the risks may be based on computed probabilities of occurrence, but many others are 
qualitative estimates of the probability of occurrence based on experience and engineering 
judgment.  An extensive flight test and safety planning process is included to reduce the risk 
further by putting forethought into what needs to be tested.  The testing addresses the most 
effective and safest approach, and what additional risk mitigation can be applied such as 
incremental testing (starting at the most benign conditions first), procedures, monitoring, etc.  
The flight test safety planning process is critical to ensuring all that is practical is done in order 
to safely proceed with flight test.  The AFFTC has process documentation that outlines what is 
required prior to a first flight but can be tailored to a specific situation or system.  The process 
tends to be very detailed and often utilizes standards but allows for some flexibility to account 
for varying systems requirements.  Alternatively, the criteria for Air Worthiness Certification 
(MIL-HDBK--516B) for operational status is usually significantly more rigorous than the 
requirements to proceed with flight test. 
U.S. Navy Nuclear Submarine Experience 
The U.S. Navy submarine development approach is an incremental process; each new 
submarine’s specifications are built on the previous submarine’s specifications.  A three-tiered 
organization and process of program management, technical authority, and safety and quality, is 
used to determine when the ship is ready for its first sea trial.  A combined complement of 
contractor and government, from these listed organizations, goes on the first sea trials where 
hull, propulsion systems, and safety systems are tested together as a system for the first time.     
A combination of contractor and Navy personnel operates the ship but nuclear power plant 
operations can only be operated by Navy nuclear personnel.  The Navy’s development process 
for submarines includes locating the ship’s crew and Navy civilians at the contractor site 
throughout manufacture and testing.  Prior to the sea trials, a “maximum reasonable assurance” 
that the ship is safe to go to sea is determined, based on the experience and judgment of the 
program management, technical authority, and safety and quality.  The crew lives on-board 
during the initial testing, followed by dock trials and Fast Cruise.  Fast Cruise is the operation of 
the ship as if it was at sea, concentrating on operations and safety systems.  Once the primary 
systems required to return the crew safely to land are tested and the vehicle/ship is determined to 
be safe, the remainder of the ship is tested.  Incremental testing and operation of systems is 
performed during sea trials that allow the crew to incrementally test up to operating capability.
NASA Engineering and Safety Center
Technical Assessment Report
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
10-00619
Version:
1.0
Title:
Readiness for First Crewed Flight
Page #:
56 of 58 
NESC Request No.: TI-10-00619 
An independent assessment is performed prior to delivery that evaluates the ship to ensure it 
meets the needs of the Navy.  The independent assessment includes a review of paperwork and 
underway trials.  Once the review is completed at the end of testing, the ship testing results are 
presented to a board.  The board evaluates two elements for unrestricted operations:  Is the 
material sound and is the ship force trained?  All mandatory deficiencies, as defined by the 
board, must be corrected prior to acceptance. 
The team observed several commonalities between AFFTC and U.S. Navy approaches.  Those 
commonalities and a brief discussion of how they might apply to a human spaceflight program 
are as follows: 
1. Both AFFTC and the U.S. Navy are able to do incremental expansion of development, 
testing, and operational capability, and thus do not initially operate at full capability of 
the vehicle.  It is more difficult for a crewed space system to do incremental expansion.  
To some extent, incremental testing of various components can be performed, however, 
incremental testing of an integrated vehicle is typically prohibitive due to cost and 
availability of one-of-a-kind hardware (unless features allowing for upgrades are part of 
the initial design). 
2. Both AFFTC and the U.S. Navy have new development programs on a regular basis.  
This on-going development allows the organizations to consistently maintain their 
knowledge and experience base, building on lessons from program to program, rather 
than having to relearn.  NASA may create a new crewed space system in multiple decade 
increments.  It is much more difficult to maintain a knowledge and experience base and 
many lessons are lost. 
3. Both AFFTC and the U.S. Navy stressed that the final evaluation was a judgment call and 
that the extensive design activities and testing that occurred prior to the first flight/sea 
trial provided information for that judgment.  As noted in #2 above, that judgment is also 
based on experience in developing new systems. 
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Appendix G.  Selected References 
The following selected references were deemed by the team to be informative and beneficial in 
addressing the question of first crewed flight. 
Human Rating: 
NPR 8705.2B, Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems 
NASA-STD-3000, Man-Systems Integration Standards, July 1995 
SSP 50808, ISS Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Interface 
Requirements Document, Revision A, April 2008 
T98-10212, A Review of Man Rating in past and Current Manned Space Flight Programs, 
A. Bond, 1998
Historical:
Mercury Chronology, http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4001/contents.htm 
Gemini Chronology, http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4002/contents.htm 
Apollo Chronology, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4009/contents.htm
Saturn Chronology (MSFC), http://history.nasa.gov/MHR-5/contents.htm
MSFC internal letter, Apollo 502 Anomaly Resolution and AS 503 Flight with Crew 
Decision, 1968 
AIAA paper 3812, ELV Human Rating, Atlas Heritage and Future Potential, author 
Holguin, tracking number 33343 
NASA TMX 57497, Pilot Safety Program for Mercury-Atlas Launch Vehicle, B A 
Hohmann, 1963 
History of Rocketry and Space Travel, W. von Braun and F. I. Ordway III, (Thomas Y. 
Crowell, New York, 1969). 
Apollo Program Summary Report, http://history.nasa.gov/apsr/apsr.htm 
Apollo-Saturn 205 Mission, MSFC 70-30, 215 C.1, Jan 1966 
Apollo links (KSC), http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/history/apollo/apollo.htm 
NASA SP Series on Space Exploration, http://history.nasa.gov/series95.html 
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Safety/Risk: 
SSP 30309E, Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Requirements, July 2009 
NPR8000.4, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements, December 2008 
NPR8715.3, Safety and Mission Assurance Plan 
NPD 8610.7D, Launch Services Risk Mitigation Policy for NASA-Owned and/or NASA-
Sponsored Payloads/Missions, January 2008 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners, 
Version 1.1, Dr. Michael Stamatelatos, NASA OSMA, August 2002. 
NASA/SP-2010-576, NASA Risk-Informed Decision Making Handbook, April 2010 
JS-2010-017, Significant Incidents Human Spaceflight, Rev A  
Design, Test, and Verification: 
NESC RP-06-108, Design, Development, Test and Evaluation Considerations for Safe and 
Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems 
Science Applications International Corporation, A Study Of Commercial Industry Best 
Practices In Test & Evaluation Which are Potentially Applicable to DoD Developmental 
Test And Evaluation, 2002 
NASA-STD-7009, Standard for Models and Simulations, August 2008 
Program/Project Management: 
7120.5D NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements 
Aerospace Report TOR-2005(8617)-4204, 100 Questions for Technical Review, September 
2005
Systems Engineering and Integration: 
NASA SP-2007-6105, NASA Systems Engineering Handbook 
NPR 7123.1A, NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements 
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